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INTRODUCTION 
This Article begins by presenting the need for further investment in 
infrastructure and by explaining why sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) could 
help.  It describes certain obstacles to realizing this goal, notably the lack of 
effective, specific regulation of SWFs.  It then proposes a potential solution 
to this problem: host states and SWFs could enter into agreements 
providing that SWFs will abide by certain obligations and that any disputes 
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will be submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) for settlement by arbitration.  After describing the legal 
details of this proposal, this Article identifies and evaluates certain 
limitations and potential problems with it. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Need for Infrastructure Development 
The importance of infrastructure to economic development is almost 
axiomatic.  Without proper roads, bridges, water supply, electrical grids, 
and telecommunication networks, people are extremely limited in creating, 
obtaining, and providing goods and services.  And when people cannot 
effectively engage in production and commerce, economic growth will 
necessarily be restricted.  Developing countries around the world are 
hampered by insufficient infrastructure, and solving this problem is 
generally considered an essential element of any plan for sustained 
economic development in these nations.1 
The construction and maintenance of infrastructure requires 
continuous and substantial investment.  One recent study estimates that by 
the year 2030, up to $67 trillion will be needed for this purpose worldwide, 
with developing countries accounting for roughly half of this amount.2  
That much money would be hard to procure under any economic 
conditions, but the recent financial crisis has exacerbated this difficulty in 
various ways.  For instance, banks’ decreased lending capacity has made it 
more difficult to borrow money for investment in infrastructure projects.3  
In addition, governments across the globe have faced critical budget 
shortfalls,4 which limits how much they can spend on their own countries’ 
 
 1.  See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, POSITIVE INFRASTRUCTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
REVITALIZING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010), available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/ip/ec/Positive-
Infrastructure-Report.pdf; Katherine Lewis, Better Infrastructure Brings Economic Growth, IIP 
DIGITAL (May 24, 2012), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2012/05/201205246230. 
html. 
 2.  MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. & MCKINSEY INFRASTRUCTURE PRACTICE, MCKINSEY & CO., 
INFRASTRUCTURE PRODUCTIVITY: HOW TO SAVE $1 TRILLION A YEAR 10 (2013), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Urbani
zation/Infrastructure%20productivity/MGI_Infrastructure_Full_report_Jan2013.ashx [hereinafter MGI 
STUDY]. 
 3.  Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008, 97 
J. FIN. ECON. 319 (2010); Christopher Harress, Bank Loans Haven’t Recovered from the Financial 
Crisis and Current Lending Shows Slide Similar to Pre-recession Data, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/banks-loans-havent-recovered-financial-crisis-current-
lending-shows-slide-similar-pre-recession-data. 
 4.  See Cash Surplus/Deficit (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
THOMAS MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2014  10:12 PM 
2014] REGULATING SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS THROUGH CONTRACT 461 
infrastructure. 
B. The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Given these obstacles, the world’s investment requirements in the 
infrastructure sector appear likely to go unmet.  To avoid this outcome, 
many different changes will be necessary, none of which will be sufficient 
by itself.  For instance, the McKinsey Global Institute considers it essential 
that countries improve their productivity in the infrastructure sector to 
lower the total amount of investment that is actually needed.5  But even if 
these improvements are made, it will also be crucial to encourage increased 
investment in this sector by those who can afford to make it. 
SWFs are among the few types of investors that can still commit funds 
in the amounts and timeframes that infrastructure projects require.  
Although there is no universally accepted definition of an SWF, the 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (the IWG) uses a 
general definition suitable for this Article’s purposes.  The IWG defines 
SWFs as “special purpose investment funds or arrangements” that are 
established and owned by governments for macroeconomic purposes to 
“hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives” and to 
employ various investment strategies, including investment in foreign 
financial assets.6 
As of March 2014, by one estimate, SWFs globally have over US$6.6 
trillion in assets under management,7 and this amount has been growing 
almost exponentially in recent years.8  Compared with other types of 
investors—such as private equity firms, which have to respond to many 
different investors, and pension funds, which have regularly occurring 
liabilities—SWFs often have less concern for liquidity and a longer-term 
investment horizon, especially following the recent financial crisis.9  As a 
 
GC.BAL.CASH.GD.ZS (last visited June 25, 2014) (showing a sharp increase in budget deficits 
between 2008 and 2009 in most countries for which data is provided). 
 5.  MGI STUDY, supra note 2, at 4. 
 6.  INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: 
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES]. 
 7.  Fund Rankings, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (last visited June 25, 
2014). 
 8.  In each of the previous five years, this figure has grown by 5.6%, 11.5%, 10.9%, 16.1%, and 
16.5% respectively, and in the aggregate, it has grown by over 75% since 2008.  PREQIN, THE 2014 
PREQIN SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND REVIEW: SAMPLE PAGES 1 (2014), available at https://www.preqin. 
com/docs/samples/2014_Preqin_Sovereign_Wealth_Fund_Review_Sample_Pages.pdf?rnd=1 
[hereinafter PREQIN REVIEW]. 
 9.  Id. at 2; Gerard Lyons, A Growing Role for Sovereign Wealth Funds, MCKINSEY ON 
SOCIETY, http://voices.mckinseyonsociety.com/sovereign-wealth-funds/ (last visited June 25, 2014). 
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result, assets such as infrastructure that provide “low risk and stable 
returns” are often particularly attractive to SWFs.10 
SWFs have historically invested most of their funds in relatively 
liquid assets, such as public equities and fixed income.11  Although these 
assets continue to constitute the majority of collective SWF assets, in 
recent years SWFs have been directing an increasing share of their funds 
toward “alternative” assets, notably infrastructure, which draws 
investments from over half of the world’s SWFs.12  In addition, compared 
with other types of investors, SWFs are more likely to invest directly in 
infrastructure than in passive assets such as unlisted funds.13  This shift has 
occurred in part because volatility in equity markets and low fixed-income 
yields in the wake of the recent financial crisis have reduced the appeal of 
these asset classes.14  Another advantage is that the timeframes of 
infrastructure projects tend to match these SWFs’ long-term investment 
horizons.15  In addition, although SWF allocations remain concentrated in 
developed countries, these funds have increasingly directed resources 
toward developing ones.16 
These trends are obviously positive for those concerned with the 
expected shortfall in infrastructure investment, particularly in the 
developing world, where domestic funds are much less available.  But 
given the formidable size of the remaining gap, it is necessary to encourage 
even further investment. 
II. CHALLENGES TO OVERCOME 
A. Concerns About Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Although SWFs have displayed an increasing enthusiasm for investing 
in infrastructure, foreign host states sometimes object to such 
transactions.17  In these cases, host states have expressed, or are suspected 
 
 10.  Lyons, supra note 9. 
 11.  PREQIN REVIEW, supra note 8, at 3. 
 12.  Id. at 2. 
 13.  Paul Bishop, Sovereign Wealth Funds Investing In Infrastructure—July 2013, PREQIN (July 2, 
2013), https://www.preqin.com/blog/101/6921/sovereign-fund-infrastructure. 
 14.  INVESCO, INVESCO GLOBAL SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT STUDY 2013, at 14 
(2013), available at http://igsams.invesco.com/downloads/IGSAMS_en.pdf [hereinafter INVESCO 
STUDY]. 
 15.  Lyons, supra note 9. 
 16.  INVESCO STUDY, supra note 14, at 21. 
 17.  Mark A. Clodfelter & Francesca M.S. Guerrero, National Security and Foreign Government 
Ownership Restrictions on Foreign Investment: Predictability for Investors at the National Level, in 
SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS 173, 174–75 (Karl P. Sauvant et al. eds., 
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to have had, concerns that SWFs are motivated not just by financial returns 
but by political considerations, “such as accessing military technology, 
controlling strategic resources or markets, or influencing public opinion.”18  
Host states may also worry “that countries operating SWFs wish to 
accumulate assets through deliberate low currency rates, thus distorting 
comparative competitive advantages.”19  Many commentators believe that 
these concerns are not justified,20 but whether they are is irrelevant to this 
Article.  After all, as long as potential host states fear these ulterior 
motives, rightly or wrongly, they will be less likely to allow SWFs to invest 
within their borders.  Therefore, these concerns are worth addressing for 
anyone seeking to promote such investment. 
In addition, in some host states, if a legal dispute eventually arises 
from the proposed investment, SWFs could potentially claim sovereign 
immunity from litigation due to their status as state instrumentalities.21  
Even though such a claim may not succeed in some states’ courts due to the 
commercial nature of the SWFs’ relevant activities (or for other reasons), 
the mere possibility of such a claim may be enough to discourage some 
host states from allowing SWF investment in their domestic infrastructure. 
It is impossible to determine with any precision just how often host 
states limit or restrict investment by SWFs.  Although official processes 
that expressly block particular transactions due to foreign sovereigns’ 
involvement may make news headlines,22 these cases may represent only a 
portion of inhibited economic activity because it is impossible to know just 
how much discussion and negotiation between host states and SWFs is 
avoided, how many invitations for investment are not sent to SWFs, or how 
many SWF bids for projects are rejected by host states. 
It is clear, however, that further investment in infrastructure is needed, 
 
2012). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Jørgen Ørstrøm Møller, Nationalism or Capitalism? Sovereign Wealth Funds of Non-OECD 
Countries, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 202, 203 (Xu Yi-chong & 
Gawdat Bahgat eds., 2010). 
 20.  See, e.g., Rolando Avendaño & Javier Santiso, Are Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments 
Politically Biased? A Comparison with Mutual Funds, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND 
POLICY REACTIONS, supra note 17, at 221 (finding that SWFs’ investment practices do not suggest 
political motives); Ørstrøm Møller, supra note 19, at 222 (concluding that EU and OECD countries 
have “little evidence” to support their fears that SWFs pose a threat). 
 21.  See FABIO BASSAN, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 89–115 (2011) (exploring 
whether and how “SWFs can invoke state immunity, protecting their action or challenging the 
enforcement of host state measures”). 
 22.  The Dubai Ports World controversy in the United States is a notable example.  See Bill Gertz, 
Security Fears About Infiltration by Terrorists, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A01, available at http:// 
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/feb/22/20060222-122115-8912r/?page=all. 
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that SWFs represent one of the best sources to meet this need, and that, as a 
result, further encouragement of SWF investment in infrastructure is 
advisable.  To accomplish this goal, it is necessary to alleviate potential 
host state concerns about SWF intentions, transparency, and governance. 
B. Existing Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
To address such concerns, in 2008 the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) convened the IWG, which consisted of 26 IMF member countries 
with SWFs, including most of the world’s largest SWFs.23  Following 
several meetings throughout the year, this group adopted a set of Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices known as the “Santiago Principles.”24  
The IWG sought to comfort potential host states and other investment 
partners by codifying principles with the following “guiding objectives”: 
 
i. To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of 
capital and investment; 
ii. To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements 
in the countries in which they invest; 
iii. To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-
related considerations; and 
iv. To have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that 
provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, and 
accountability.25 
 
The Santiago Principles themselves consist of 24 discrete principles 
that provide somewhat more specific directives regarding one or more of 
the four objectives listed above.26  A few of the principles contain two or 
more “subprinciples” that elaborate on the main principles to which they 
correspond.27  For instance, the first of these principles appears as follows: 
 
GAPP 1. Principle 
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its 
effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s). 
GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple.  The legal framework for the SWF should 
ensure legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions. 
GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple. The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and 
 
 23.  SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 1. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 4. 
 26.  Id. at 7–9. 
 27.  Id. 
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structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and other 
state bodies, should be publicly disclosed.28 
 
Despite the best efforts of the IWG, the Santiago Principles face some 
inherent limitations on their ability to encourage host states to permit and 
promote investments by SWFs.29  First, the principles were designed to be 
loose in nature, in part so that each endorsing state could implement them 
in the manner that best fits its particular circumstances.30  Even if the literal 
fulfillment of every principle sufficed to accomplish the IWG’s objectives, 
in reality many host states might want to see more specific, substantial, and 
numerous commitments from SWFs or the states to which they belong. 
Second, to the extent that the Santiago Principles do provide for clear 
undertakings by SWFs, they do not in any way constitute binding or 
enforceable obligations.  This is, once again, by design: the IWG expressly 
calls these rules “a voluntary set of principles and practices that the 
members of the IWG support and either have implemented or aspire to 
implement.”31  Hence, a mere aspiration to implement the rules is all that is 
required for endorsement.  For a host state that is genuinely concerned 
about an SWF’s intentions or governance, the SWF’s simple endorsement 
of the Santiago Principles is unlikely to provide much comfort absent 
additional actions, disclosures, or undertakings by the SWF. 
Even if the Santiago Principles were somehow made binding on 
SWFs, their practical enforceability would still be questionable.  In this 
scenario, host states and SWFs might designate a forum in which the 
former could bring claims that the latter have breached their obligations.  If 
they were to choose the national courts of the host state, or if they were to 
remain silent on the issue and those courts were the default forum under 
applicable law, then further concerns could arise. 
For instance, under certain circumstances, SWFs might be able to 
claim that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the national 
courts’ jurisdiction.  In addition, while making this claim, the SWF might 
benefit from various procedural protections or advantages.  For instance, in 
the United States, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(FSIA),32 
 
 
 28.  Id. at 7. 
 29.  For a more detailed assessment of the Santiago Principles, see EDWIN M. TRUMAN, 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION? 121–39 (2010). 
 30.  SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 5. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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pre-judgment attachment of property is excluded unless immunity from 
such attachment has been specifically waived and there is a showing that 
the attachment is to secure satisfaction of later judgment, not to obtain 
jurisdiction.  In addition, if a civil action is brought in state court against 
a SWF, the defendant may remove it to the federal district court in that 
district, where any trial will be before a judge without a jury.  The SWF 
has a presumption of immunity under the FSIA, which the plaintiff has 
the burden of rebutting by showing that the action falls into one of the 
statute’s exceptions.  If the plaintiff fails to make such a showing, then 
the SWF will be afforded immunity, unless, of course, it has otherwise 
waived immunity.33 
 
In many cases, if the SWF were found to be acting in a commercial 
capacity, thereby fitting into an exception to the host state’s doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, the national courts might have jurisdiction after all.34  
But there does not appear to be any established case law regarding the 
application of these doctrines to SWFs, and in some situations, SWFs have 
indeed benefitted from sovereign immunity.35  Furthermore, as described 
above, the mere potential relevance of sovereign immunity to any particular 
investment dispute might exhaust time and resources as the parties debate 
its applicability.  For all of these reasons, in countries in which a sovereign 
immunity doctrine might apply, national courts might prove both unreliable 
and inefficient for resolving disputes that arise from SWF investments. 
The choice of national courts as a forum could also negatively distort 
behavior through moral hazard if an SWF were to ignore the host state’s 
laws on the assumption that it would be protected by sovereign immunity.  
Indeed, this might be a legitimate fear of a potential host state and might 
reduce the likelihood that the state would permit the SWF’s investment in 
the first place.  By contrast, if the doctrine of sovereign immunity were to 
not apply to an SWF’s actions and if the host state’s national courts were to 
have jurisdiction over an investment-related dispute, then the SWFs might 
fear that those courts would unfairly favor the state because of its “home 
court advantage.”  This too could limit investment by SWFs. 
Accordingly, the Santiago Principles, as the primary form of 
regulation that is specific to SWFs, are too vague to provide enough 
 
 33.  Clare O’Brien, Tania Mattei, & Naveen Thomas, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving 
Perceptions and Strategies, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., Dec. 24, 2012, at 6 (citation omitted), available 
at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2013/01/Sovereign-Wealth-
Funds-Evolving-Perceptions-and-__/Files/View-full-article-Sovereign-Wealth-Funds-Evolvin__/File 
Attachment/SovereignWealthFundsEvolvingPerceptionsandStrate__.pdf. 
 34.  See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012); 
BASSAN, supra note 21, at 93–96 (discussing immunity in other jurisdictions). 
 35.  BASSAN, supra note 21, at 104–06. 
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guidance to SWFs or to alleviate the concerns of potential host states.  
Their non-binding nature and unenforceability also limit the comfort that 
host states can reasonably take in these principles.  This Article proposes a 
different approach to regulation that is intended to address all of these 
issues with the ultimate goal of promoting investment and thereby 
development. 
III. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO REGULATION 
To overcome the challenges described in the previous section, 
effective regulation of SWF investments must provide for binding and 
enforceable obligations that are clear enough both to provide direction to 
SWFs and to reassure host states that SWFs will not cause harm.  To these 
ends, this Article proposes a form of regulation through individual and 
enforceable contracts.  Host states that are concerned about SWFs’ 
intentions, governance, or other characteristics should make agreements 
with the SWFs (or the investor states to which they belong) in advance of 
their investments.  Such an agreement should provide that, in exchange for 
the SWF’s right to invest in the host state, the SWF shall abide by the 
Santiago Principles and comply with any more specific obligations that the 
host state reasonably requires.  These provisions would ensure that the 
SWF’s obligations are binding and as clear as necessary to reassure the 
host state that the investment can safely proceed. 
To make the obligations not only clear and binding but also effectively 
enforceable, the parties should consent to submit any dispute arising out of 
or relating to the agreement (which would of course include any claim that 
the SWF has breached any of its obligations) to ICSID for settlement by 
arbitration.  In addition, each party should waive any rights of sovereign 
immunity that might apply to the execution of any awards that may be 
rendered against that party.36  As opposed to litigation in the host state’s 
national courts, these provisions would ensure that no such rights would 
preclude jurisdiction over a dispute or execution of an award (reassuring 
the host state) and that the host state will not have an unfair “home court 
advantage” in its national courts (reassuring the SWF). 
A. Substantive Obligations in the Agreement 
As described above, one of the main limitations of the Santiago 
Principles as a form of regulation is their non-binding nature.  An express 
 
 36.  See, e.g., ICSID Model Clauses: VII. Waiver of Immunity from Execution of the Award, INT’L 
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/model-
clauses-en/15.htm (last visited June 25, 2014). 
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written agreement between the host state and the SWF could overcome this 
limitation by imposing a binding obligation on the SWF to abide by those 
principles. 
Another limitation of the Santiago Principles is their vague nature and 
potentially insufficient scope.  For instance, one principle that may 
particularly interest host states is the third: 
 
Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic 
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely 
coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to 
ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.37 
 
Depending on the nature of the investment and the relationship between the 
parties, the host state may wish to provide more precise requirements for 
coordination of the SWF’s activities with domestic authorities.  These 
requirements might, for instance, specify certain activities from which the 
SWF should refrain, reserve the host state’s right to preapprove certain 
other activities, or impose specific reporting obligations on the SWF.  To 
effect these goals, the agreement between the host state and the SWF could 
impose additional obligations on the SWF or place conditions (e.g., the 
prior written consent of an agency of the host state) on certain specified 
actions by the SWF. 
These steps could make the SWF’s obligations binding, more specific, 
and better-tailored to the nature of a particular investment.  To have real 
value, however, the proposed arrangement must also have an effective and 
reliable enforcement mechanism.  This is where ICSID comes into play. 
B. International Arbitration in the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 
1. Background 
The World Bank established ICSID in 1965 through the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States (the ICSID Convention).38  Since then, 150 states (Contracting 
States) have ratified the ICSID Convention and have remained contracting 
parties.39  ICSID “provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of 
 
 37.  SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 7. 
 38.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Introduction to ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATIONS AND RULES 5 (2006), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basic 
doc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
 39.  Member States, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank. 
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investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other 
Contracting States,”40 with the aim of removing “major impediments to the 
free international flows of private investment posed by non-commercial 
risks and the absence of specialized international methods for investment 
dispute settlement.”41  It is generally considered “the leading international 
arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute settlement.”42 
To date, ICSID has concluded 285 cases, nearly all of which arose 
from investors bringing actions against host states due to a breach by the 
latter of obligations contained in a bilateral investment treaty or another 
agreement.43  This is characteristic of the broader international investment 
regime, which was assembled largely to protect foreign investors from 
wealthy countries against regulatory abuses by poorer host states.44  But 
investments by SWFs may invert this supposed power dynamic, with host 
states fearing abuses by sovereign investors.  This scenario calls for a 
different approach to regulation. 
The one-sided nature of ICSID’s history does not mean that it is 
suitable only for disputes brought by investors: nowhere do the ICSID 
Convention or ICSID’s other rules and regulations limit its facilities to 
cases of this nature.45  The overarching goal of ICSID is to promote 
international investment.  So far it has done so by reassuring investors that 
they will have a viable avenue for recourse if the host state mistreats them, 
but now there is an opportunity for ICSID to also encourage investment by 
offering host states a reliable forum in which to bring actions against 
abusive investors, as elaborated below. 
2. Jurisdictional Requirements 
For ICSID’s jurisdiction to extend to a dispute, the following 
requirements must be met: (1) the disputing parties must have consented in 
writing to the submission of their dispute to ICSID arbitration or 
 
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=MemberStates_H
ome (last visited June 25, 2014). 
 40.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 38, at 5. 
 41.  About ICSID, INT’L CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=AboutICSID_Ho
me (last visited June 25, 2014). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  List of Concluded Cases, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded (last 
visited June 25, 2014). 
 44.  José E. Alvarez, Sovereign Concerns and the International Investment Regime, in SOVEREIGN 
INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS, supra note 17, at 258, 259–61. 
 45.  See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 38. 
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conciliation, (2) the dispute must be between a Contracting State and a 
national of another Contracting State, and (3) the dispute must qualify as a 
“legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.”46  Fortunately, all of 
these requirements could be satisfied by disputes brought by host states 
against SWFs for breach of the SWFs’ contractual obligations. 
First, the requirement of consent would be easily satisfied in the 
situation under discussion.  The Report of the Executive Directors on the 
Convention explains that “[c]onsent may be given, for example, in a clause 
included in an investment agreement, providing for the submission to 
[ICSID] of future disputes arising out of that agreement, or in a compromis 
regarding a dispute which has already arisen.”47  Therefore, an agreement 
containing such a dispute resolution provision made between a host state 
and an SWF would constitute consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction. 
As for the second requirement, with 150 Contracting States as of this 
writing, ICSID’s membership would cover the vast majority of the 
potential pairs of host states and states with active SWFs.48  A “national” of 
a Contracting State includes “any juridical person which had the nationality 
of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the date 
on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or 
arbitration” (i.e., the date of the agreement including the dispute resolution 
clause).49  SWFs are typically juridical persons with the nationality of the 
states to which they belong, so they would generally qualify as “nationals” 
for the determination of ICSID’s jurisdiction.50 
 
 46.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), in ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 38. 
 47.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, Report of the Executive Directors of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States ¶ 24, in ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 38. 
 48.  Of the 60 SWFs with the most assets under management, only three do not belong to 
Contracting States.  See Fund Rankings, supra note 7; see also INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. 
DISPS., LIST OF CONTRACTING STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION (2013), 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal= 
ShowDocument&language=English (last visited June 25, 2014). 
 49.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 25(2)(b). 
 50.  An SWF in such a dispute might object to ICSID’s jurisdiction on the grounds that it is not a 
“national” but instead a “State party” due to its status as a state-owned entity, but respondents who have 
contested jurisdiction on these grounds in the past have failed.  See, e.g., Ceskoslovenska Obchodni 
Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 16–17 (May 24, 1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 251 (1999) (stating that “the accepted test for” 
determining “whether a company qualifies as a national of another Contracting State within the 
meaning of Article 25(1) . . . . has been formulated as follows: . . . for purposes of the Convention a 
mixed economy company or government-owned corporation should not be disqualified as a national of 
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The third jurisdictional requirement turns on the definitions of “legal 
dispute” and “investment.”  To qualify as a “legal dispute,” “[t]he dispute 
must concern the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or the 
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for breach of a legal 
obligation.”51  This criterion would be satisfied by a host state’s claim that 
an SWF had breached its obligations under a legally binding agreement.  
As for the term “investment,” the framers of the ICSID Convention made 
“no attempt . . . to define” it and instead deferred to the parties to “make 
known in advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they 
would or would not consider submitting to” ICSID.52  Therefore, to ensure 
that disputes arising from an SWF’s investment can be brought in ICSID, 
the agreement between the host state and the SWF should define 
“investment” broadly to include all contemplated activities expected to 
arise from the transaction, and the parties should amend this definition 
upon any expansion of those activities beyond its previous scope.53 
Therefore, as long as the host state and the state to which the SWF 
belongs are both Contracting States, parties seeking to submit any 
investment disputes to ICSID could straightforwardly fulfill the 
 
another Contracting State unless it is acting as an agent for the government or is discharging an 
essentially governmental function” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also CHRISTOPH H. 
SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 161–62 (2d ed. 2009) (summarizing 
several cases that “confirm that claimants may have significant State ownership interests, but still 
qualify as a ‘national of another Contracting State’ for the purposes of Art. 25(1)”). 
 51.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 47, ¶ 26. 
 52.  Id. ¶ 27. 
 53.  Note, however, that parties do not have unlimited freedom in defining what constitutes an 
investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.  Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 48–53 (Aug. 6, 2004), 19 ICSID Rev. 
486 (2004) (“[T]here is a limit to the freedom with which the parties may define an investment if they 
wish to engage the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals.”).  ICSID tribunals may examine sua sponte whether 
the objective requirements of jurisdiction have been satisfied.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. 
DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 41.  In this manner, some tribunals have considered whether the alleged 
investment (i) has a certain duration, (ii) involves a certain regularity of profit, (iii) involves a certain 
level of risk and commitment, and (iv) is significant for the host state’s development.  See SCHREUER 
ET AL., supra note 50, at 128–34 (setting forth these criteria and examining how various tribunals have 
applied them “to determine whether the activities under dispute constitute an investment”).  The 
infrastructure projects that are the subject of this Article would likely meet any such test, as ICSID 
tribunals in the past have found a wide range of infrastructure projects to have done so.  See, e.g., 
M.C.I. Power Grp. L.C. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award (July 31, 2007), 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0500.pdf (construction of 
electricity plants); L.E.S.I. S.p.A. v. République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 12, 2006), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC528_Fr&caseId=C48 (construction of a dam); Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 23, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004) (civil 
construction contract). 
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institution’s jurisdictional requirements by including appropriate provisions 
in the same written agreement that sets forth the SWF’s obligations.  This 
is most of what is required to ensure that a reliable dispute resolution 
mechanism will be available, but to ensure that any award rendered by an 
arbitral tribunal will also be enforceable, some additional measures are 
advisable. 
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
The ICSID Convention requires each Contracting State, whether or 
not it is a party to the dispute, to recognize any award as binding and to 
enforce the award’s pecuniary obligations (i.e., obligations to pay money) 
as if the award were a final judgment of the state’s domestic courts.54  
Therefore, when an award is rendered, the prevailing party can enforce it in 
any Contracting State.  This ability can be useful when the losing party 
does not voluntarily pay on the award and has assets located in a 
Contracting State.  In this situation, the prevailing party can seek to execute 
the award against those assets in compliance with the state’s applicable 
legal procedures. 
But if the assets that the prevailing party seeks to execute belong to a 
state or state instrumentality such as an SWF, then the court may decline to 
order the execution because the assets are protected by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.55  Indeed, the framers of the ICSID Convention 
expressly contemplated this possibility, noting that “[t]he doctrine of 
sovereign immunity may prevent the forced execution in a State of 
judgments obtained against foreign States or against the State in which 
execution is sought.”56  To make this clear, the ICSID Convention provides 
that nothing in the provision requiring Contracting States to recognize and 
execute awards should “be construed as derogating from the law in force in 
any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign 
State from execution.”57  In fact, such a situation played out when a 
company controlled by French nationals, after winning an ICSID award 
against Liberia, sought to execute the award against assets of Liberia 
located within the United States.58  The U.S. federal courts ultimately 
denied these requests, largely because the assets were protected by 
 
 54.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 54. 
 55.  See BASSAN, supra note 21, at 93–96 (providing an overview of SWFs and their immunity 
from jurisdiction). 
 56.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 47, ¶ 43. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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sovereign immunity under the FSIA.59 
In the case of an agreement between an SWF and a host state, such an 
outcome could be prevented if each party were to expressly “waive[] any 
right of sovereign immunity as to it and its property in respect of the 
enforcement and execution of any award rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal 
constituted pursuant to [the] agreement.”60  In most investments not 
involving SWFs, only the host state would be protected by sovereign 
immunity, so only the host state would ever make such a waiver.  But when 
the investor and its property might also be protected, as in the case of an 
SWF, it makes sense for the waiver to be bilateral.61  In this situation, when 
a host state seeks to execute an ICSID award against an SWF’s assets in a 
Contracting State, the SWF could not claim that those assets are protected 
by sovereign immunity. 
If properly implemented, these measures should ensure that host states 
and SWFs will have recourse to a reliable and effective dispute resolution 
mechanism, resulting in legally enforceable awards. 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Diversion of Investment 
Some may be concerned that the approach proposed in this Article 
could discourage investment by SWFs in host states that insist that the 
SWFs make binding and enforceable obligations with respect to their 
activities.  SWFs deterred by host states that make these requests might 
choose instead to invest in less demanding host states, to make only passive 
 
 59.  See Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606, 610 
(D.D.C. 1987) (“The Court, however, declines to order that if any portion of a bank account is used for 
a commercial activity then the entire account loses its [sovereign] immunity.”). 
 60.  ICSID Model Clauses: VII. Waiver of Immunity from Execution of the Award, supra note 36. 
 61.  Of course, this waiver would be useful to the host state only if the SWF signing the agreement 
has assets that are both located in Contracting States and substantial enough to satisfy payment of a 
potential award.  This may not be the case, for instance, if the SWF is newly constituted solely for the 
investment corresponding to the agreement.  In such a situation, the host state should seek to have the 
state to which the SWF belongs cosign the agreement, guarantee the obligations of the SWF under both 
the agreement and any arbitral award issued by an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to the 
agreement, and waive its rights of sovereign immunity as described above.  One limitation of this 
approach is that the state’s guarantees would not be enforceable through ICSID arbitration: they would 
be made by one state to another, and ICSID disputes must be between a state on one hand and a national 
of a different state on the other hand.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46, 
art. 25(1).  Therefore, the agreement would have to designate a separate forum, most likely the host 
state’s national courts, with respect to those provisions, and this may not be useful if the guarantor state 
does not have substantial assets within the host state.  Fortunately, SWFs by their nature typically do 
have substantial assets in Contracting States around the world, so the situation presented in this 
paragraph should arise only very rarely, if ever, and state guarantees should not typically be needed. 
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rather than direct investments in infrastructure (e.g., investing in an unlisted 
funds or purchasing a non-controlling stake in a local entity), or to divert 
funds to an asset class other than infrastructure.  Eventually, such a trend 
could discourage states from adopting this Article’s proposed approach or 
could even reduce the total amount of investment by SWFs in 
infrastructure. 
The justifiability of this fear depends ultimately on the amount of 
leverage that each party has in the negotiation, which is difficult to 
generalize across different transactions.  If a host state were to have a great 
deal of leverage prior to the commencement of an investment because, for 
instance, the state offered uniquely lucrative opportunities, then one would 
expect the SWF to be more likely to agree to certain obligations than it 
would be when dealing with a host state that presents essentially fungible 
opportunities. 
As a result, it would be wise for host states to assess the degree of 
leverage that they possess in any negotiation with an SWF and to insist on 
an agreement of the sort proposed by this Article only when that degree is 
relatively high.  In addition, the host state would be justified in requesting 
such an agreement whenever it has particularly serious concerns about the 
SWF’s intentions, governance, or other characteristics.  If a request in that 
situation causes the SWF to balk, then it might indicate the SWF’s 
unwillingness to cooperate more generally, and its withdrawal might be in 
the host state’s best interests.  In this way, a request that the SWF accept 
reasonable obligations could allow the host state to test the SWF’s level of 
commitment to a fair and mutually beneficial relationship. 
Therefore, although this concern might limit the utility of the proposed 
approach in some situations, it could still be implemented to host states’ 
benefit when they most need reassurance and security. 
B. Limitations of ICSID 
Another potential inadequacy of the proposed approach arises from 
the limitations of ICSID.  Because ICSID cases have almost all been 
brought by investors against host states, arbitrators who normally serve on 
ICSID tribunals, including those on the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, may 
not have the experience needed to determine all of the issues that may arise 
in the contractual disputes envisaged by this Article.  They may know a 
great deal about expropriation of investors’ assets by host states but know 
little of, for instance, how to calculate the damage to host states resulting 
from malfeasance by investors.  Similarly, they may have expertise in 
interpreting bilateral investment treaties but difficulty with the kinds of 
private contractual arrangements proposed in this Article.  As a result, the 
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parties may need to appoint arbitrators with more relevant experience, even 
if they have not served in many ICSID cases.62  Eventually, the Contracting 
States may wish to choose new arbitrators to serve on the Panel. 
Although ICSID’s limitations may impede the adoption of the 
proposed approach at first, in the long term it should not prevent these 
arbitrations from taking place successfully.  Any novel process requires 
certain changes, and initial inexperience with SWFs should pose no more 
difficulty for ICSID than did the Centre’s initial establishment.  Indeed, the 
institutional framework is already present and sufficient for the arbitrations 
contemplated by this Article, with no significant organizational or legal 
changes necessary.  Accordingly, the process of identifying new arbitrators, 
while potentially tedious, should not bar the development of a promising 
new way to encourage investment, which is, after all, ICSID’s ultimate 
goal. 
C. Resource Limitations 
ICSID arbitrations can be costly, and some developing countries may 
not have the resources necessary to pursue claims against SWFs who have 
breached their contractual obligations.  It would be easy to overstate this 
problem, however, because many developing countries have already 
participated in ICSID arbitrations to completion.63  To the extent that 
excessive costs pose an issue, one potential solution would be for the 
agreement between the parties to require the SWF to pay the host state’s 
expenses in connection with an arbitration in which the host state prevails. 
The feasibility of including such a requirement in the agreement 
would depend, once again, on each party’s leverage in the negotiation.  As 
a result, when (1) a host state expects that it will not be able to afford 
arbitration expenses, (2) an SWF refuses to agree to cover these expenses, 
and (3) the host state is particularly concerned that the SWF will breach its 
obligations, the host state should consider not allowing the investment.  But 
again, if the host state’s concern is legitimate, then avoiding this investment 
might be in the state’s best interests. 
CONCLUSION 
These practical considerations are important to keep in mind, but 
rather than invalidating the approach proposed by this Article, they refine 
 
 62.  Parties in an ICSID arbitration may select arbitrators from outside of the ICSID Panel of 
Arbitrators.  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 46, art. 40(1). 
 63.  Note the prevalence of developing countries among the parties in the list of concluded cases 
at ICSID.  See List of Concluded Cases, supra note 43. 
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its scope and present important yet surmountable obstacles to its complete 
implementation.  Overall, the regulation of SWFs through contractual 
obligations that are enforceable through international arbitration would 
constitute an improvement on today’s non-binding, imprecise, insufficient, 
and unenforceable forms of self-regulation.  If potential host states that 
would otherwise reject investments by SWFs chose instead to allow them 
to proceed with contractual protections in place, then these states would 
eventually attract more money for crucial development purposes such as 
infrastructure, as their economies so urgently need. 
